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Abstract. Any researcher interested in defining the concept of 
quality of life faces a difficult epistemological task in terms of 
harmonizing a concept that seems by its very nature subjective and 
dispersed. Therefore, at present one can not speak of a universally 
accepted definition of quality of life but a series of different approaches 
to the concept based on hypothesis, assumptions and methods of analysis 
and research. From this viewpoint, the main aim of the present paper is 
to analyze two most known approaches on the concept of quality of life, 
so as to highlight the epistemological difficulties and challenges inherent 
to these approaches. Nevertheless, this paper does not seek definitive 
answers to the epistemological dilemmas, but set into the limelight these 
difficulties for further encouraging debate on these questions which might 
advance the state of research. 
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1. Introduction 
The quality of life is a relatively new concept emerged from the pressing 
need for a better understanding the complexity of human action from the 
perspective of its ends: prosperity, welfare, and wellbeing, as concepts 
transcending mere economic meaning and define a much more complex state of 
the individual. Although in its inception the concept may be located in 
economic studies, in a relative brief period of time, it stirred the interest of 
many scholars from various fields such as sociology, ethics, law, to name just a 
few, thus acquiring a strong interdisciplinary character. The concept has been 
validated not only as pure scientific notion, but also as defining element in 
public policy. One of the most recent proofs in this respect is the foundation in 
2008 of the “Sarkozy commission” led by two of the most influential 
contemporary economists (Amartya Sen and Joseph Stiglitz), with main aim to 
re-define the measuring methods, from a more qualitative approach of living 
standards and welfare of people. On the other hand, defining such a complex 
concept as quality of life is not an easy task, as argued by Nussbaum and Sen 
(Nussbaum, Sen, 1993, p. 4): “The search for a universally applicable account 
of the quality of human life has, on its side, the promise of a greater power to 
stand up for the lives of those whom tradition has oppressed or marginalized. 
But it faces the epistemological difficulty of grounding such an account in an 
adequate way, saying where the norms come from and how they can be known 
to be the best. It faces, too, the ethical danger of paternalism, for it is obvious 
that all too often such accounts have been insensitive to much that is of worth 
and value in the lives of people in other parts of the world and have served as an 
excuse for not looking very deeply into these lives”.  
Under these circumstances, the development of various definitions and 
approaches is a natural result. In the light of so many definitions and 
approaches, the main epistemological difficulty resides in combining such an 
array of perspectives on a concept which by its very nature seems subjective 
and dispersed. The researcher, disciple of traditional epistemology true to 
scientific objectivity, is faced with the dilemmatic perspective of sacrificing 
objectivity for accuracy.  
From this viewpoint, the main aim of the present paper is to analyze two 
most known approaches on the concept of quality of life, so as to highlight the 
epistemological difficulties and challenges inherent to these approaches. 
Nevertheless, this paper does not seek definitive answers to the epistemological 
dilemmas, but set into the limelight these difficulties for further encouraging 
debate on these questions which might advance the state of research.  
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2. The utilitarian approach 
As Sen observed, “Utilitarianism was for a very long time the «official» 
theory of welfare economics in a thoroughly unique way” (Sen, 2008, p. 5). In 
this context, the utilitarian approach might be considered as the dominant 
approach in the philosophy of science for almost two centuries, as the result of, 
on the one hand, utilitarian philosophy initiated by Bentham and perfected by 
Mill, and, on the other hand, of registered progress in economic science through 
inclusion and use in analysis on large scale of the concept of economic utility 
and mostly marginal utility under its original diverse denominations. This new 
kind of analysis emerged from the epistemological necessity to offer a viable 
alternative to the holistic approach with often times inductivist tinges based on 
the generalization of behavior and economic variables specific to theories 
initiated by economists traditionally encased in the classical current, fact which, 
in the end, generated a crisis of the specifically economic instruments and 
methods. Thus, marginal analysis not only allowed for the pure economic 
science to surpass the gripe generated by the ascension of holistic currents 
which foresaw the collapse of free economy, but also created the necessary 
parameters to develop a new branch in economic science – welfare economics. 
In the utilitarian approach, quality of life essentially depends on the level 
of welfare of the individual, where welfare is defined as the pleasure or desire 
satisfaction one obtains from using goods or, in broader terms, resources. This 
simple definition succeeds to elegantly solve two apparently incompatible 
methodological problems for any social science: the universality of a scientific 
theory, on the one hand, and individualism which is specific to human behavior, 
on the other hand. 
As the universality of theory entails the identification of a common 
measure unit, applicable to any case, this definition oriented utilitarian approach 
towards the interpretation of welfare which would allow a direct relation 
between the quantity of goods an individual possesses and his or her welfare 
status. This relationship has been generated by the following rationale of 
simplifying character which appears to be an eloquent example of the 
nomological-deductive method described in the Popper-Hempel-Oppenheim 
model: welfare depends on the satisfaction of the individual, whereas the 
satisfaction of the individual derives from the consumption of goods. 
Consequently, welfare is in a relation of direct proportionality with the capacity 
of the individual to acquire goods. Clearly, this reasoning does not imply that 
two individuals with a similar quantity of identical goods have the same level of 
welfare, because in the case of the two, the utility of consumption of the same George Şerban-Oprescu 
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type of goods may differ, but, on the other hand, this reasoning shows the path 
towards better welfare - acquiring and then, consumption of goods. 
The ever present temptation offered by the identification of a common 
feature of a quantifiable financial instrument by means of income and 
consumption to assess welfare was much too strong not to be followed and to 
waste time with the appraisal of certain methodological malfunctions that could 
ultimately and essentially alter the result of the research. Hence, in this way we 
may explain why important advocators of welfare such as V. Pareto,   
F.Y. Edgeworth or A. Marshall focused mainly on the way individuals may obtain 
resources and the way the respective are distributed at the level of society. Under 
the present circumstances, it becomes obvious that Pareto efficiency or the function 
of utility does not represent something else than analysis instruments of welfare 
derived from the above detailed rationale, used as such.  
Regrettably, the utilitarian approach of welfare economics and quality of 
life as they were conceived by traditional economists of welfare eventually felt 
into the trap of holism as hard as it sought to avoid it. Focusing on the 
aggregate welfare lost sight of the special character of the utilitarian – the 
individualist methodology in which the way welfare is distributed among the 
members of society ought to be decisive. Besides, one of the main criticisms 
brought to the utilitarian approach is precisely this aggregate feature, the lack of 
importance regarding the ways in which wealth is distributed among the 
members of society thus leaving utilitarianism somewhere in between the sum 
of total of human happiness and average individual happiness. 
In fact, the expected fallacy of utilitarianism was instilled, involuntarily, 
by J.S. Mill from its very inception through what scholars, starting with 
Prinicipia ethica by G.E. Moore use to call the naturalistic fallacy. Mill’s 
confusion between individual desire and desirability, hard as it is to understand 
for an economist with a sharp methodological sense, showed the restrictions in 
analyzing aggregate welfare thus directing this approach to the general 
assumption that the quality of life is reflected exclusively in the subjective state 
of the person. Following this reasoning, utilitarianism was faced with the 
apparently insurmountable problem: it cannot warrant the drawing of adequate 
protective boundaries around the essential interests of individuals, and it does 
not allow them the space to pursue the personal concerns which give meaning 
to their lives. This dilemmatic situation further transcends the area of quality of 
life by Sen who argues: “The utilitarian calculus based on, say, happiness can 
be deeply unfair to those who are persistently deprived, such as the traditional 
underdogs in stratified societies, oppressed minorities in intolerant 
communities, precarious sharecroppers living in a world of uncertainty, sweated 
workers in exploitative industrial arrangements, subdued housewives in deeply An Epistemological Perspective on the Quality of Life Concept  
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sexist cultures. The hopelessly deprived people may lack the courage to desire 
any radical change and often tend to adjust their desires and expectations to 
what little they see as feasible. They train themselves to take pleasure in small 
mercies. The practical merit of such adjustments for people in chronically 
adverse positions is easy to understand: this is one way of making deprived 
lives bearable. But the adjustments also have the incidental effect of distorting 
the scale of utilities” (Sen, 2008, p. 6). 
Presently, for a significant array of researchers, utilitarianism is brought 
to the forefront under the overshadowing of cold and pragmatic approach, 
trapped into an intransigent and narrow-minded approach, in which, from one 
point forward, someone’s happiness may be reached through someone else’s 
unhappiness and in which quality of life is reduced to a simple problem of 
distribution of resources and monetary calculus of income and expenses. 
2. The capabilities approach 
Utilitarianism has received numerous criticisms over time, but perhaps the 
most powerful critics, those who have managed to irrevocably shake the 
foundations were those made by John Rawls and Amartya Sen, who, in the end, 
succeeded to change the utilitarian approach in quality of life with the capabilities 
and functionings approach showing that, as Sen points: “the value of the living 
standard lies in the living, and not in the possessing of commodities, which has 
derivative and varying relevance” (Sen, 1987, p. 25). The individual must not 
track welfare in the classical sense which can be financially measured, but a 
superior condition opposed to the current one, which is given neither by the 
quantity of owned goods, nor by the level of welfare and hence cannot be limited 
to the evaluation through resources, as Sen confirms: “The central feature of 
well-being is the ability to achieve valuable functionings. The need for 
identification and valuation of the important functionings cannot be avoided by 
looking at something else, such as happiness, desire fulfillment, opulence, or 
command over primary goods” (Sen, 1985, p. 200). Subsequently, capabilities 
and functionings approach, according to Sen, renders resources into a much more 
complex notion, that of capabilities, which transcend economic significance and 
acquire an interdisciplinary character. In the present overarching, the concept of 
quality of life undergoes a change of significance via a definition entailing a 
person's ability to do valuable acts or reach valuable states of being (Nussbaum, 
Sen, 1993, p. 30). Sen continues, arguing that “The approach is based on a view 
of living as a combination of various «doings and beings», with quality of life to 
be assessed in terms of the capability to achieve valuable functionings” 
(Nussbaum, Sen, 1993, p. 30). The connection between functionings and George Şerban-Oprescu 
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capabilities is more clearly established by way of defining capabilities as: “the 
various combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that the person can 
achieve”. Capability is, thus, a set of vectors [or n-tuples] of functionings, 
reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of life or another... to choose 
from possible livings’ (Sen, 1992, p. 40) or, to put it differently, “Functionings 
represent parts of the state of a person – in particular the various things that he or 
she manages to do or be in leading a life. The capability of a person reflects the 
alternative combinations of functionings the person can achieve, and from which 
he or she can choose one collection” (Nussbaum, Sen, 1993, p. 31). 
At first glance the progress of such an approach is quite obvious: analysis 
concentrates on the individual personality, expanding at the same time the area 
of significance of living standards and quality of life much beyond possession 
or resource accumulation. In fact, the real progress made by this approach is 
given by the revaluation of the concept of quality of life by calling the 
following reasoning: quality of life derives from emotional states and these 
states are not limited to material means (Alkire, 2009, p. 3) 
Nevertheless, once with the progress and the extension of the term, there 
follows the methodological paradox of how can one commensurate and 
compare interpersonally, the elements which give value to the quality of life, 
since “they can not be mechanically reduced to a single common denominator, 
such as happiness or utility” (Alkire, 2009, p. 3). Moreover, for the accuracy of 
argumentation, we should highlight the fact that the capabilities approach 
confronts itself with two evaluation shortcomings: one at the level of the 
element aggregation which composes the living standard and another regarding 
the tangible assessment of these elements. This difficulty is also observed by 
Sen (Nussbaum, Sen, 1993, p. 32), who argues: “In an evaluative exercise, we 
can distinguish between two different questions: (1) What are the objects of 
value? (2) How valuable are the respective objects?” 
One of the most frequent solution is suggested by Alkire, who points: 
“Rather, the capability approach is applied differently depending on the purpose 
of the measure, the place and situation (or, if comparability is required, the 
places to be compared), the level(s) of analysis, the data available, the 
institutions it will guide, and the kind of analyses that the measure will catalyze 
or inform. The methods by which it is applied are, similarly, plural. The 
concrete purpose of the application provides necessary definition” (Alkire, 
2009, p. 7). This solution solves the problem of quantification transferring it 
into the area of public policy and methodological instrumentalism which 
suggest that any solution is good as long as it is applicable. This way: “The 
identification of a space does not foreclose the possibility of using different 
indicators – including subjective and resource indicators – to better understand An Epistemological Perspective on the Quality of Life Concept  
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quality of life. Capabilities can also be analyzed using quantitative, qualitative, 
participatory, and subjective data, and using administrative, census, survey, and 
institutional data” (Alkire, 2009, p. 7). This manner of approach has been 
otherwise suggested by Sen, who argued: “While the identification of value-
objects and the specification of an evaluative space involve norms, the nature of 
the norms must depend on precisely what the purpose of the evaluation is” 
(Nussbaum, Sen, 1993, p. 35). 
Also, the previously proposed solution maintains that the quality of life 
concentrated on the individual as fundamental unit of analysis, but one remark 
is promptly added in order to rescue from the assumption that this solution is in 
any way subordinated to methodological individualism: “The capability 
approach adopts what Robeyns (2008) calls ethical individualism, but does not 
adopt other kinds of  individualism (to which many, rightly in our view, would 
object) which she calls ontological and methodological individualism” (Alkire, 
2009, p. 8). Not only is this form of individualism different from ontological 
individualism, which assumes that society is made up of a collection of 
individuals who dispose of certain properties, and from the methodological one, 
which argues that any social phenomena may be explained through human 
action, but it is the only form of individualism that proves to be applicable to 
capabilities approach. It is clear thus, that there is an elevated form of 
individualism, as approach opposed to holism, which “does not allow the 
achievements of a group to be celebrated without taking note of deprivations 
and unfreedoms that certain members of the group may quietly suffer” (Alkire, 
2009, p. 8). 
Thus, in an almost imperceptible manner, the capabilities approach enters 
in the shallow waters of ethics and value judgments, by means of a mechanism 
directly transient from the phenomenon that David Hume observed a while ago: 
“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always 
remarked that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of 
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations 
concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprized to find that instead 
of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no 
proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is 
imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or 
ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, `tis necessary that it 
should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be 
given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a 
deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.” (Hume, 2000,   
p. 334). George Şerban-Oprescu 
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But which is ultimately the danger in judgment values? Supporters of 
capabilities approach would answer that none, demarcating themselves 
categorically from the traditional epistemological vision. While, traditional 
epistemology and especially positivist would answer that the greatest danger 
with value judgments lies in the disappearance of the criterion of demarcation 
between science and common knowledge; supporters of capabilities approach 
argue that we have come to that point where scientific progress is no longer 
possible if one does not accept value judgments as viable working hypothesis. 
The adepts of capabilities approach argue for their position by two means: on 
one hand, they attack the difficult, artificial and abstract character to be applied 
of logic positivism by using, among other, Duhem-Quine hypothesis of the 
impossibility of individually testing one possibility (Nussbaum, Sen, 1993,   
p. 143) and, on the other hand, by supporting choice of hypothesis, essentially 
of the operators used in the analysis of quality of life, cannot be pursued if not 
appealing to value judgments. This argument suggests that no social science can 
be disinterested, as value judgments reside in the larger interest depleted over 
one economic theme in disfavor of another. In other words, always 
“assumptions are impregnated in value”, because they are the result of a 
researcher's choice that is subjective by definition. The argument is sustained by 
the capabilities approach in the following rationale: If the interest to select a 
particular problem or approach may be the result of value judgments, the 
objective nature of science can be maintained by a research method based on 
logical arguments and/or factual evidence. 
Ultimately, one last argument in favor of capabilities approach would be 
that if the researcher overtly assumes judgment values, then his scientific 
endeavor is as honest as possible and more so, internalizing and discussing 
these judgment values is the one fact which makes economics more interesting. 
This is in fact what Sen also points. “There is no escape from the problem of 
evaluation in selecting a class of functionings in the description and appraisal of 
capabilities, and this selection problem is, in fact, one part of the general task of 
the choice of weights in making normative evaluation... The need for selection 
and discrimination is neither an embarrassment, nor a unique difficulty, for 
conceptualizing functionings and capabilities” (Sen, 2008, p. 11). 
Clearly, the objectivity-value judgments controversy continues in many 
other areas related with quality of life concept and will continue for a long time. 
What is noteworthy is that the capabilities approach seems to resist the siege of 
the traditional epistemological trends, and, moreover, to impose a new vision on 
methodological approach in quality of life issues. 
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4. Conclusions 
Consistent with the purpose aimed at in the introduction, the present 
paper concentrated on the analysis from the perspective of epistemological 
foundations, of two common approaches in the study of quality of life. The 
analysis of the two approaches, the utilitarian one and the one on functions and 
capabilities, proves to be interesting from at least three points of view, that can 
be summarized as follows: (1) they are probably the most known methods to 
analyze the quality of life; (2) seem to have common source in the area of 
economic science and (3) the methods promoted by these are the result of 
opposed epistemological views. On the one hand the utilitarian approach, 
although generated by the need to overcome an epistemological barriere 
imposed by the hollistic method, in the end gave up to analyze subjective 
context in favor of an objectivism imposed by the traditional epistemological 
perspective. On the other hand, the approach based on functions and capabilities 
seems to have chosen precisely the rationale of context, despite all the risks 
related to an objective character which can be challenged from the point of view 
of theories more or less in fashion regarding scientific knowledge. Therefore, 
both approaches specific to quality of life seem to be the result of crucial 
choices or sacrifices from the perspective of methodology, fact which may 
render them vulnerable to criticism directed towards this angle. But, while the 
utilitarian approach shows that it has exhausted its resources and that it has at 
least temporarily abandoned the methodological battle, the approach based on 
functions and capabilities demonstrates that it can successfully face any 
epistemological controversy, thus proving a viable path in deciphering 
phenomena and meanings specific to quality of life.  
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